Scientific Discovery and Maxwell's Kinetic Theory
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10705323 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Achinstein (Johns Hopkins University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 409-434 |
| Publication date | 1987-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/289391 |
| OpenAlex | W2034185958 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 4 |
By reference to Maxwell's kinetic theory, one feature of hypothetico-deductivism is defended. A scientist need make no inference to a hypothesis when he first proposes it. He may have no reason at all for thinking it is true. Yet it may be worth considering. In developing his kinetic theory there were central assumptions Maxwell made (for example, that molecules are spherical, that they exert contact forces, and that their motion is linear) that he had no reason to believe true. In this paper I develop a position that explains why they were worth considering, and that rejects the retroductive position that a hypothesis is worth considering when, if true, it would explain the observed data
Classical mechanics · Economics · Epistemology · Inference · Kinetic energy · Kinetic theory · Mathematical economics · Physics · Position (finance) · Statistical physics · Theoretical physics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
| Citations per year | 0.24 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2009 - 2024 (16) |
| Highly cited | No |