A Note on Semantic Realism
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10705342 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Carl G Hempel (Yale University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1950 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 169-173 |
| Data de publicação | 1950-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/287078 |
| OpenAlex | W2089716158 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 1 |
Professor Feigl's admirably lucid and concise appraisal of the major considerations which are still significant in the controversy between realism and phenomenalism includes the important reminder that the problem at hand should be viewed as concerning, not the truth or falsity of two conflicting hypotheses, but rather the comparative adequacy of two alternative proposals for the rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge. Feigl advocates the approach of semantic realism in preference to a phenomenalistic type of reconstruction on the grounds that in his critical examination, the latter has been “found wanting,” whereas semantic realism—and only semantic realism—can provide a satisfactory systematic account of the meaning and the experiential foundation of scientific hypotheses. While I fully agree with Feigl's general appraisal of the issues involved, I have doubts as to the superiority of the proposed realistic interpretation, and I should like to state these here in outline
Epistemology · Falsity · Foundation (evidence) · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Nominalism · Political science · Realism · Scientific realism · Scientific theory · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,07 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2011 - 2011 (1) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 1 |