Carnap, the Principle of Tolerance, and Empiricism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10705407 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Hudson (0000-0002-6713-1043, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 341-358 |
| Publication date | 2010-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/652960 |
| OpenAlex | W2068591915 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 8 |
Kurt Gödel criticizes Rudolf Carnap's conventionalism on the grounds that it relies on an empiricist admissibility condition, which, if applied, runs afoul of his second incompleteness theorem. Thomas Ricketts and Michael Friedman respond to Gödel's critique by denying that Carnap is committed to Gödel's admissibility criterion; in effect, they are denying that Carnap is committed to any empirical constraint in the application of his principle of tolerance. I argue in response that Carnap is indeed committed to an empirical requirement vis-à-vis tolerance, a fact that becomes clear upon closer scrutiny of Carnap's relevant writings
Constraint (computer-aided design) · Conventionalism · Empiricism · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Scrutiny · Theology · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,14 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2019 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |