Causation and the Problem of Disagreement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10705644 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Enno Fischer (0000-0003-3758-4655, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 773-783 |
| Publication date | 2021-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/714852 |
| OpenAlex | W3094765571 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 8 |
This article presents a new argument for incorporating a distinction between default and deviant values into the formalism of causal models. The argument is based on considerations about how causal reasoners should represent disagreement over causes, and it is defended against an objection that has been raised against earlier arguments for defaults
Argument (complex analysis) · Causation · Default · Economics · Epistemology · Formalism (music) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 1.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |