Causation, Agency, and Independence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10705662 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel M Hausman (0000-0003-0249-3518, University of Wisconsin–Madison, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | S4 |
| Pages | S15-S25 |
| Publication date | 1997-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/392583 |
| OpenAlex | W2095060618 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 7 |
This paper explores versions of agency or manipulability theories of causation and argues that they are unacceptable both for the well-known reasons of their anthropomorphism, limited scope, and circularity and because they are subsumed by an alternative “independence” theory of causation, which is free of these difficulties
Agency (philosophy) · Causation · Epistemology · Independence (probability theory) · Scope (computer science) · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2011 - 2021 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |