Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10705665 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Maarten Van Dyck (0000-0002-2904-8361, Ghent University Hospital, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 689-700 |
| Publication date | 2009-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/605823 |
| OpenAlex | W2073293541 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
I show why Michael Friedman's idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm change as members of a convergent series introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm change on what I take to be Friedman's own terms
Appeal · Compromise · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics) · Kantian ethics · Perspective (graphical) · Political science · Rationality · Social science · Sociology · Computer Science · History and Theory of Mathematics · Law · Mathematical and Theoretical Analysis · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,07 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2011 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |