Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10708207 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Patricia Kitcher (University of Minnesota, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1985 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 78-97 |
| Publication date | 1985-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/289223 |
| OpenAlex | W2013783079 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 17 |
Three recent, influential critiques (Stich 1978; Fodor 1981c; Block 1980) have argued that various tasks on the agenda for computational psychology put conflicting pressures on its theoretical constructs. Unless something is done, the inevitable result will be confusion or outright incoherence. Stich, Fodor, and Block present different versions of this worry and each proposes a different remedy. Stich wants the central notion of belief to be jettisoned if it cannot be shown to be sound. Fodor tries to reduce confusion in computational psychology by dismissing some putative tasks as impossible. Block argues that the widespread faith in functionalism is just not warranted. I argue that all these critiques are misguided because they depend on holding cognitive psychology to taxonomic standards that other sciences routinely rise above
Cognition · Cognitive science · Confusion · Epistemology · Faith · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · Psychoanalysis · Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies · Data Visualization and Analytics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
The Experimental Philosophy
Varieties of Progress
The Advancement of Science
Realism and Scientific Progress
Dissolving Rationality
The Organization of Cognitive Labor
Legend's Legacy
The Microstructure of Scientific Change
Darwin's Achievement
Ecological Psychology and Naturalism
Some Remarks on a Relational Concept of Mind
Classifying and Clarifying
Two Neglected Classics of Comparative Ethics
Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception
Marr's Computational Theory of Vision
Methodological Solipsism and Explanation in Psychology
Conceptual Revolutions? How Not to Naturalize the Philosophy of Science
On Naturalizing the Semantics of Mental Representation
Rules and representations
What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain
Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology
Mental representation
Rules and representations
Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role
Explanatory Unification
Individualism and the Mental
Language, Mind, and Knowledge
| Citations per year | 0.47 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1988 - 2008 (21) |
| Highly cited | No |