Bayesian Orgulity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10708227 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gordon Belot (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 483-503 |
| Publication date | 2013-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/673249 |
| OpenAlex | W4233599004 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 21 |
A piece of folklore enjoys some currency among philosophical Bayesians, according to which Bayesian agents who, intuitively speaking, spread their credence over the entire space of available hypotheses are certain to converge to the truth. The goals of the current discussion are to show that that kernel of truth in this folklore is in some ways fairly small and to argue that Bayesian convergence-to-the-truth results are a liability for Bayesianism as an account of rationality since they render a certain sort of arrogance rationally mandatory
Bayesian probability · Credence · Epistemology · Folklore · Machine learning · Mathematical economics · Rationality · Sociology · sort · Artificial Intelligence · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
The Necessary Uniformity of Physical Probability
Bayesian Convergence for Computably Bounded Agents
Pride and Probability
Risky business
The introduction of topology into analytic philosophy
Immodesty and permissivism
On the role of explanatory and systematic power in scientific reasoning
A non-probabilist principle of higher-order reasoning
Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot
Standards for Modest Bayesian Credences
Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence
Bayesian Convergence to the Truth and the Metaphysics of Possible Worlds
Bayesian Humility
An Axiomatic Theory of Inductive Inference
Curve-Fitting for Bayesians
Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity
Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting
| Citations per year | 1.55 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |