The Effect of the Top Two Primary on the Number of Primary Candidates
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10764652 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John H Beck (Gonzaga University), Kevin E Henrickson (Gonzaga University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 94 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 777-794 |
| Publication date | 2013-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Science Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0038-4941 • E-ISSN: 1540-6237 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00876.x |
| OpenAlex | W1937305498 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 35 |
Objectives W ashington S tate held its first “top two primary” in 2008. Under this system, the two candidates receiving the most votes move on to the general election, regardless of party affiliation. This study empirically examines the potential incentive under this top two primary system for each political party to discourage “excess” party candidates from entering primary contests. Methods We examine this possibility by looking at the W ashington S tate L egislative P rimaries in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. With these data, we estimate the factors impacting the number of primary candidates in a race for each political party, including the change in the primary format in 2008. Results Our results indicate that the switch to the top two primary reduced the likelihood of having multiple D emocratic candidates in a race, reduced the number of “excess” D emocratic candidates, but did not have a significant impact on R epublican candidates. Conclusion With many states revising their primary systems, an understanding of the incentives present under alternative systems is critical. As such, the results presented in this study provide evidence that the top two primary gives the political parties an incentive to discourage excess primary candidates
Demographic economics · Economics · General election · Incentive · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Primary (astronomy) · Primary election · Public economics · Race (biology) · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Gender Politics and Representation · Gender Studies · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Law
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| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2020 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |