The Perspective from Pyongyang
Limits of Compromise
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10804841 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrei Lankov (0000-0003-0876-880X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 107-118 |
| Publication date | 2021-11-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Survival (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-6338 • E-ISSN: 1468-2699 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00396338.2021.2006447 |
| OpenAlex | W3217501636 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
The denuclearisation of North Korea is unlikely. Neither pressure nor rewards will persuade North Korean decision-makers to surrender their nuclear weapons because they have good reasons to see denuclearisation as tantamount to collective suicide. Therefore, the only realistic goal of the United States and the international community is arms control. There are ways to reward North Korean leaders for their willingness to restrict their nuclear and missile programmes. These include partial removal of sanctions, economic assistance and subsidised investment. However, any deal will be costly, since North Korea will exact maximum compensation for its willingness to accept an arms-control regime. Reaching an agreement also will be time consuming. A grand bargain is unattainable, and the parties will have to take small, incremental steps
Compensation (psychology · Compromise · Control (management · Economic sanctions · Economics · International community · Law and economics · Nuclear weapon · Perspective (graphical · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sanctions · Surrender · Computer Science · Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies · Law
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |