Singular concepts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10807828 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nolwenn Salmon (0000-0002-3551-7435, University of California, Santa Barbara, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 204 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-024-04624-w |
| OpenAlex | W4400301525 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 29 |
Alonzo Church proposed a powerful and elegant theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions and singular concepts. Church’s proposed theory accords with his Alternative (0), the strictest of his three competing criteria for strict synonymy. The currently popular objection to strict criteria like (0) on the basis of the Russell–Myhill antinomy is here rebutted. Russell–Myhill is not a problem specifically for Alternative (0); it is a refutation of unrestrained concept comprehension. Unrestricted comprehension is also inconsistent with facts about sets of properties. Criteria more lax than (0) are philosophically inadequate. In particular, the rival conception of propositions as classes of possible worlds is subject to a fatal philosophical collapse. It follows on that conception, given that each of us is fallible, that everyone believes everything. It is shown, however, that Church’s proposed theory is vulnerable under (0) to a version of Russell’s notorious Gray’s Elegy objection. Some amendments to Church’s proposal are proffered, including an amendment, first proposed in the author’s Frege’s Puzzle (1986), that addresses Russell’s objection. Church’s response (personal correspondence) is considered
Antinomy · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Semantic Relationism
Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types
A Puzzle about Belief
Philosophia Naturalis
Alonzo Church's Contributions to Philosophy and Intensional Logic
Epistemological Consequences of Frege Puzzles
Cognition and recognition
To Be F Is To Be G
A paradox about sets of properties
A Theory of Structured Propositions
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |