Introduction to the special issue “Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility”
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10808103 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrea Kruse (Ruhr University Bochum, corresponding author), Heinrich Wansing (0000-0002-0749-8847, Ruhr University Bochum) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 194 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 2667-2671 |
| Publication date | 2017-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-016-1153-6 |
| OpenAlex | W2461305720 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
Agency (philosophy) · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Responsibility and Control
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification
Should have known
Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism
Agency of belief and intention
On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism
Attitudinal control
Doxastic freedom
Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief
On the analogy of free will and free belief
Believing intentionally
| Highly cited | No |
|---|