The function of modal judgment and the Kantian gap

Bibliographic Data

ID10808458
AuthorsJessica Leech (0000-0001-9731-5882, King's College London, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume198
IssueS13
Pages3193-3212
Publication date2021-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-018-1810-z
OpenAlexW2803485861
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited22

What is the function of modal judgment? Why do we (need to be able to) make judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, in fact, dispensable? This paper introduces and develops an answer to these questions based on Kant’s remarks in section 76 of the Critique of Judgment. Here, Kant appears to argue the following: that a capacity to make modal judgments using (categorial) modal concepts is required for a capacity for objective representation, in light of our split cognitive architecture. This split cognitive architecture leaves room for a mismatch between our concepts and intuitions and, Kant argues, that is why we need modal concepts and modal judgments. In this paper, I develop this account of the function of modal judgment and to explore the extent to which it may improve upon contemporary alternatives. I focus on one particularly important challenge for the account: to explain why a distinction between the actual and the possible, rather than merely a distinction between the actual and the non - actual , is required. In order to answer this question, I supplement the account with a particular way of thinking about objectivity

Cognition · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Function (biology) · Metaphysics · Modal · Objectivity (philosophy) · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Political science · Representation (politics) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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