Logical abductivism on abductive logic
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10810388 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Francesco Mancini (0000-0002-1061-7982), Filippo Mancini (University of Bonn, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 203 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Publication date | 2024-05-31 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-024-04626-8 |
| OpenAlex | W4399213623 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 38 |
Logical abductivism is the epistemic view about logic according to which logical theories are justified by abduction (or Inference to the Best Explanation), that is on how well they explain the relevant evidence, so that the correct logical theory turns out to be the one that explains it best. Arguably, this view should be equally applied to both deductive and non-deductive logics, abduction included. But while there seems to be nothing wrong in principle in using abduction to determine the correct logical theories of deduction and induction, things might be more complicated regarding logical theories of abduction. We may wonder whether allowing for an abductive justification of a theory of abduction is an epistemically legitimate move, since here circularity casts its shadow and makes the situation darker. This is the issue to which this work is devoted. I will defend that, to be effective, an abductive justification for a theory of abduction calls for a justification of abduction in advance, which we do not yet have
Abductive reasoning · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Programming language · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
Laws and Symmetry
In Contradiction
Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic
Revising logic
Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology
Modal Logic as Metaphysics
Philosophical Naturalism
The logic of paradox
Identifying logical evidence
Inference, explanation, and asymmetry
Proof-theoretic pluralism
Logical abductivism and non-deductive inference
A dialogical route to logical pluralism
Testing Inference To The Best Explanation
Begging the question as a pragmatic fallacy
Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection
The Inference to the Best Explanation
How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified
What Intuitions Are Like 1
Epistemic Circularity
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |