Why can’t what is true be valuable
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10811410 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jim Hutchinson (0000-0001-5784-0850, Simon Fraser University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2021 |
| Volumen | 198 |
| Número | 7 |
| Páginas | 6935-6954 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2021-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Editorial | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-019-02499-w |
| OpenAlex | W2995780000 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 32 |
Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy
Philosophical studies.
Pragmatism
The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories
The Strike of the Demon
The Varieties of Intrinsic Value
Love as a Moral Emotion
Good and Evil
The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts
Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality (1984)
Solidarity or Objectivity?
The Right and the Good
The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues
Thick Concepts
What We Owe to Each Other
Post-Analytic Philosophy
Two Distinctions in Goodness
Intention and Intentionality
Tropic of Value
Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
Personal Value
Epistemology and cognition
Is Epistemic Normativity Value-Based
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |