Indeterministic grounding

Bibliographic Data

ID10811768
AuthorsShlomit Wygoda Cohen (0000-0002-9623-560X, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume204
Issue1
Publication date2024-07-02
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-024-04648-2
OpenAlexW4400245910
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited31

Grounding is sometimes thought of as metaphysical causation. If we take this analogy seriously, given the possibility of indeterministic causation we have at least prima facie reason to accept the possibility of indeterministic grounding. However, prima facie reasons are defeasible and there may be stronger reasons to reject this possibility. This paper sets out to critically examine this mostly overlooked possibility. After introducing the possibility of indeterministic grounding as analogous to indeterministic causation (Sect. 1), I clarify further the notion of indeterministic grounding by relating it to failure of supervenience (Sect. 2). I then construct an argument for the logical or conceptual possibility of indeterministic grounding, and defend it against a few possible objections (Sect. 3). Next, I explore and reject various reasons for dismissing the possibility of indeterministic grounding (Sects. 4 and 5). And I conclude by considering why philosophers almost universally overlook or rule out the possibility of indeterministic grounding, by examining the case of physicalism (Sect. 6)

Analogy · Argument (complex analysis) · Causation · Defeasible estate · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Physicalism · Prima facie · Reductionism · Supervenience · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access