Indicating without revealing

A posteriori physicalism and the new challenge

Bibliographic Data

ID10812414
AuthorsPeng Zhou (0000-0002-2499-6805), Zhou Peng (0000-0002-3349-8736, Chinese University of Hong Kong, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume206
Issue2
Publication date2025-08-06
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-025-05163-8
OpenAlexW4413028703
LanguageEN
References cited52

A posteriori physicalism has been challenged by philosophers who claim that it cannot do justice to the substantial nature of the content of phenomenal concepts. This is called the New Challenge. This paper focuses on Philip Goff’s version of the New Challenge, where “the substantial nature” is understood in terms of conceptual transparency. Three existing objections to Goff’s argument will be examined: radical opacity, soft translucency, and Dual Carving. It will be demonstrated that none of them is successful. By identifying an implicit assumption about reference determination in Goff’s argument that a posteriori physicalists need not and should not accept, I propose a novel reply to the New Challenge. The solution consists in a combination of two ideas: first, phenomenal concepts have substantial contents in the sense of being essence-indicating; two, phenomenal concepts can refer non-satisfactionally. In this way, a posteriori physicalists can do full justice to the challenging fact without jeopardizing minimal intelligibility of the world

A priori and a posteriori · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Physicalism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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