Intuitionistc probability and the Bayesian objection to dogmatism

Bibliographic Data

ID10812420
AuthorsMartin Smith (0000-0002-0465-4760, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume194
Issue10
Pages3997-4009
Publication date2017-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-016-1120-2
OpenAlexW2374205943
LanguageEN
References cited9

Given a few assumptions, the probability of a conjunction is raised, and the probability of its negation is lowered, by conditionalising upon one of the conjuncts. This simple result appears to bring Bayesian confirmation theory into tension with the prominent dogmatist view of perceptual justification—a tension often portrayed as a kind of ‘Bayesian objection’ to dogmatism. In a recent paper, David Jehle and Brian Weatherson observe that, while this crucial result holds within classical probability theory, it fails within intuitionistic probability theory. They conclude that the dogmatist who is willing to take intuitionistic logic seriously can make a convincing reply to the Bayesian objection. In this paper, I argue that this conclusion is premature—the Bayesian objection can survive the transition from classical to intuitionistic probability, albeit in a slightly altered form. I shall conclude with some general thoughts about what the Bayesian objection to dogmatism does and doesn’t show

Bayesian inference · Bayesian probability · Bayesian statistics · Epistemology · Frequentist probability · Linguistics · Mathematical economics · Metaphysics · Negation · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Simple (philosophy) · Statistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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