Fineness of grain and the hylomorphism of experience
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10812716 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sascha Settegast (0000-0001-6530-2809, Heidelberg University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 201 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-023-04201-7 |
| OpenAlex | W4380682879 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 42 |
A central objection to McDowell’s conceptualism about empirical content concerns the fine-grained phenomenology of experience, which supposedly entails that the actual content of experience cannot be matched in its particularity by our concepts. While McDowell himself has answered this objection in recourse to the possibility of demonstrative concepts, his reply has engendered a plethora of further objections and is widely considered inadequate. I believe that McDowell’s critics underestimate the true force of his reply because they tend to read unrecognized empiricist presuppositions into his account of experience. To show this, I introduce a new hylomorphic reading of McDowell’s account of experience and argue that the objections to his reply all rest on a specific empiricist assumption, which is untenable because it conflates the form of experience with its content. Consequently, conceptualism so understood can resist all of these objections, as I attempt to show by systematizing and answering them
Conceptualism · Content (measure theory) · Demonstrative · Empiricism · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Presupposition · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?
Mind and World
McDowell and identity theories of truth
Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality
Sources of Knowledge
On Perceiving That
Two Concepts of Rules
Mental Acts
Demonstrative Concepts and Experience
The Non‐conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience
Reasons for Belief
A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content
Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content
A Note on McDowell's Response to the Fineness of Grain Argument
Specialized Visual Experiences
Interpreting Davidson
Speech Acts
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |