Functionalism and structuralism in biology
Stances or explanatory strategies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10812931 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sandy C Boucher (0000-0002-0575-7497, University of New England, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 206 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2025-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-025-05128-x |
| OpenAlex | W4411880702 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
Functionalism in biology is the view that with respect to organic form, structure is explained in terms of function, and structuralism is the view that structure is explained independently of function. Recent work on the topic has focused on ‘meta-level’ question such as, how should functionalism and structuralism be understood? What sort of positions are they? How if at all can they be justified? And what role to they play in biology? I have argued (Boucher 2015) that they should be understood as philosophical stances sensu van Fraassen (2002): clusters of attitudes, values, goals and commitments, rather than factual beliefs. In making this case I adapt van Fraassen’s argument for treating materialism as a stance in this sense. In both cases, I suggest, only the stance interpretation can do justice to the manifest historical continuity of these views, and the fact that they have persisted through revolutionary changes in theory. In her recent book (2023), Rose Novick offers a critique of my view, and suggests that functionalism and structuralism should be construed rather as explanatory strategies. This can, she claims, capture the historical continuity of the views, while also having the virtue of showing how function-structure disputes can be empirically decided, something the stance account struggles with. In this paper I defend my view against Novick’s critique, while extending and developing it. I argue that Novick’s conception of explanatory strategies is too minimalist to capture the forms of functionalist and structuralist reasoning in question, and propose an expanded, richer and, I claim, more adequate explanatory schema for functionalism and structuralism that builds in value judgments characteristic of stances. And I respond to Novick’s normative claim that even if functionalism and structuralism have in fact taken the form of stances, it would be better for biology if such stances did not exist
Epistemology · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · Metaphysics · Philosophy of biology · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Structuralism (philosophy of science) · Origins and Evolution of Life · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
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| Highly cited | No |
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