What-it’s-like talk is technical talk

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10813294
AutoresErlend Owesen (0000-0002-4526-7783, University of Cambridge, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume201
Fascículo4
Data de publicação2023-03-31
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSynthese (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-023-04123-4
OpenAlexW4362590508
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas17

It is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as what it is like to be in a mental state. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning, i.e. a meaning for which the association to the relevant expression is peculiar to a theoretical community. The relevant theoretical community is philosophy and some parts of cognitive science, so on this view, only philosophers and cognitive scientists use the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in the way that is characteristic in the literature on phenomenal consciousness. This claim has important consequences. Firstly, I argue that the phrase says nothing informative about phenomenal consciousness. Secondly, I argue that the fact that non-philosophers use the phrase is not compelling evidence that they believe in phenomenal consciousness. These claims have further consequences for debates about phenomenal consciousness

Cognition · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Metaphysics · Nothing · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Phrase · Sociology · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology