Some problems with particularism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10813419
AutoresKeith Raymond Harris (0000-0002-2278-9028, Ruhr University Bochum, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen200
Número6
Páginas447-447
Fecha de publicación2022-10-29
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSynthese (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-022-03948-9
PMID36340861
OpenAlexW4307960191
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas12
Referencias citadas38

Particularists maintain that conspiracy theories are to be assessed individually, while generalists hold that conspiracy theories may be assessed as a class. This paper seeks to clarify the nature and importance of the debate between particularism and generalism, while offering an argument for a version of generalism. I begin by considering three approaches to the definition of conspiracy theory, and offer reason to prefer an approach that defines conspiracy theories in opposition to the claims of epistemic authorities. I argue that particularists rely on an untenably broad definition of conspiracy theory. Then, I argue that particularism and its counterpart are best understood as constellations of theses, rather than a pair of incompatible theses. While some particularist theses are highly plausible, I argue that one important particularist thesis is false. The argument for this conclusion draws on the history of false conspiracy theories. I then defend this conclusion against a pair of potential objections

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Opposition (politics) · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Political science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment