The correctness and relevance of the modal ontological argument

Bibliographic Data

ID10813767
AuthorsAndrzej Biłat (0000-0003-1884-1361, Warsaw University of Technology, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume199
Issue1-2
Pages2727-2743
Publication date2021-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-020-02908-5
OpenAlexW3115305840
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited17

This paper deals with some metaphilosophical aspects of the modal ontological argument originating from Charles Hartshorne. One of the specific premises of the argument expresses the idea that the existence of God is not contingent. Several well-known versions of the argument have been formulated that appeal to different ways of clarifying the latter. A question arises: which of the formally correct and relevant versions is proper or basic? The paper points to some criteria of formal correctness, and distinguishes two types of relevance for these versions: strong and weak. Its aim is to furnish a strictly worked out answer to the question, taking into account each of these types. As a result, a very simple, formally correct and (weakly) relevant version of the modal ontological argument is formulated. The results obtained are also used to criticize a popular belief about the relations in which the main versions of the modal ontological argument stand to one another

Algorithm · Appeal · Argument (complex analysis) · Correctness · Epistemology · Explication · Metaphysics · Modal · Modal logic · Ontological argument · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of religion · Philosophy of science · Political science · Relevance (law) · Simple (philosophy) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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