The future ain’t what it used to be
Strengthening the case for mutable futurism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10814512 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Giacomo Andreoletti (0000-0001-5632-4213, University of Tyumen), Giuseppe Spolaore (0000-0001-9420-2364, University of Padua, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 199 |
| Issue | 3-4 |
| Pages | 10569-10585 |
| Publication date | 2021-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-021-03259-5 |
| OpenAlex | W3177974669 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 18 |
This paper explores mutable futurism, the view according to which the future can literally change—that is, it can happen that a future time t changes from containing an event E to lacking it (or vice versa). Mutable futurism has received little attention so far, and the details and implications of the view are underexplored in the literature. For instance, it currently lacks a precise metaphysical model and a formal semantics. Although we do not endorse mutable futurism, our goal here is to strengthen the case for mutable futurism and help establish it as a worthy contender in the debate on the philosophy of time. To attain this goal, (i) we try to make mutable futurism, along with its metaphysical and inferential commitments, as clear as possible, by providing it with a coherent metaphysical model and a plausible semantics, and (ii) we show that it can be backed by theoretical reasons
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Event (particle physics) · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Physics · Programming language · Semantics (computer science) · Computer Science · Origins and Evolution of Life · Philosophy · Psychology · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |