A new characterization of scientific theories
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10815448 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jody Azzouni (0000-0002-1626-0670, Tufts University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 191 |
| Issue | 13 |
| Pages | 2993-3008 |
| Publication date | 2014-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-014-0469-3 |
| OpenAlex | W2128076271 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 30 |
First, I discuss the older “theory-centered” and the more recent semantic conception of scientific theories. I argue that these two perspectives are nothing more than terminological variants of one another. I then offer a new theory-centered view of scientific theories. I argue that this new view captures the insights had by each of these earlier views, that it’s closer to how scientists think about their own theories, and that it better accommodates the phenomenon of inconsistent scientific theories
Epistemology · Metaphysics · Nothing · Phenomenon · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Scientific theory · Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies
The Structure of scientific theories
Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality
Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice
Talking About Nothing
The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics
How the Laws of Physics Lie
Explaining Science
Laws and Symmetry
Science and Partial Truth
The Structure and Dynamics of Theories
The structure of scientific revolutions
Deflating Existential Consequence
Realism and formal semantics
How to be realistic about inconsistency in science
Inconsistency and scientific reasoning
Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice
The scientific image
| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2014 - 2023 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |