Propositional contingentism and possible worlds
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10815693 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher James Masterman (0000-0002-5997-1085, University of St Andrews, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 200 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Publication date | 2022-09-27 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-022-03879-5 |
| OpenAlex | W4297316296 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 45 |
Propositional contingentism is the view that what propositions there are is a contingent matter—certain propositions ontologically depend on objects which themselves only contingently exist. Possible worlds are, loosely, complete ways the world could have been. That is to say, the ways in which everything in its totality could have been. Propositional contingentists make use of possible worlds frequently. However, a neglected, but important, question concerns whether there are any notions of worlds which are both theoretically adequate and consistent with propositional contingentism. Some notion of a possible world is adequate if the systematic connection between, at least, possibility and truth at some possible world holds. Here, I argue that no adequate notion of a possible world is available to at least those who subscribe to one natural formulation of propositional contingentism. I also show that this result contrasts with a simple and adequate definition of a possible world available to the necessitist—those who hold that necessarily everything necessarily exists
Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Possible world · Propositional calculus · Propositional formula · Propositional variable · Simple (philosophy) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Two notions of necessity
Plurals and modals
Plantinga on Possible Worlds
Quality and Concept
Modal Logic as Metaphysics
Past, Present and Future
Actualism and possible worlds
Thisness Presentism
Existence
The Proper Treatment of Predication in Fine-Grained Intensional Logic
Actualism and thisness
A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds
Serious Actualism
On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2024 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |