Internal Reasons and the Problem of Climate Change
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10830107 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Hall (0000-0003-0215-978X, Auckland University of Technology [email protected]) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 160 |
| Pages | 27-52 |
| Publication date | 2019-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0495-4548 • E-ISSN: 2171-679X |
| Publisher | Berghahn Books (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3167/th.2019.6616003 |
| OpenAlex | W2971573640 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Climate action is conventionally framed in terms of overcoming epistemic and practical disagreement. An alternative view is to treat people’s understandings of climate change as fundamentally pluralistic and to conceive of climate action accordingly. This paper explores this latter perspective through a framework of philosophical psychology, in particular Bernard Williams’s distinction between internal and external reasons. This illuminates why the IPCC’s framework of ‘Reasons for Concern’ has an inefficacious relationship to people’s concerns and, hence, why additional reason giving is required. Accordingly, this paper recommends a model of truthful persuasion, which acknowledges the plurality of people’s motivations and sincerely strives to connect the facts of climate change to people’s subjective motivational sets
Action (physics · Climate change · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Perspective (graphical · Persuasion · Sociology · Climate Change and Geoengineering · Climate Change Communication and Perception · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2022 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |