Is Miller's Minimalist Approach to Human Rights Obligations Coherent
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10830516 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Pearson (0000-0002-0164-9499) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 129 |
| Publication date | 2011-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0495-4548 • E-ISSN: 2171-679X |
| Publisher | Berghahn Books (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3167/th.2011.5812904 |
| OpenAlex | W2038108848 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 3 |
This paper asks whether David Miller's minimalist theory of human rights is coherent with his claim that obligations of global justice involve obligations to provide people with a minimally decent life. I argue that there is a justice gap in Miller's theory: the structure of his distinction between basic and societal needs is such that people will be left below the level of minimal decency even when obligations of justice are met. Miller can either bite this bullet or look for alternative sources of obligations of justice. I take up the second option by arguing that there can be obligations of global justice to build institutions that enable societies to generate income and wealth
Economic Justice · Global justice · Human rights · Law and economics · Miller · Political science · Sociology · Human Rights and Development · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |