Preference, Pluralism, and Proportionality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10853019 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bruce Chapman (0000-0002-6054-7695, University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 177-196 |
| Publication date | 2010-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | University of Toronto Law Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0042-0220 • E-ISSN: 1710-1174 |
| Publisher | University of Toronto Press Inc. (UTPress) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.3138/utlj.60.2.177 |
| OpenAlex | W4240900943 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
Inspired by Michael Trebilcock's commitment to pluralism, this essay analyses the balancing and accommodating of competing values, often a central task in the making of legal judgments. Part i shows why it is so difficult to resist being utilitarian in one's approach to this problem. Using the methods of social choice theory, the author shows that some seemingly reasonable conditions ineluctably lead to the utilitarian result where the different values are suitably weighted and summed. However, Part ii demonstrates that the utilitarian approach is less compelling than it appears. An alternative method for the aggregation of values, namely, the product rule proposed by John Nash, is also available. The product rule recommends different results than the utilitarian summation rule, and does so in a way that does less violence to the genuine pluralism of very different values. Part iii relates these different results to the law's commitment to proportionality and to sequenced and bilateral processes of adjudication
Adjudication · Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Pluralism (philosophy · Political science · Positive economics · Proportionality (law · Social choice theory · Sociology · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Legal principles and applications · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |