The Prisoners' Dilemma as an Extended Arrow Problem
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10874583 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Frank Louis Rusciano (Rider College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 495-510 |
| Publication date | 1990-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Western Political Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0043-4078 • E-ISSN: 2325-8675 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591299004300305 |
| OpenAlex | W1995388949 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 14 |
t is generally acknowledged that the two most significant problems in the choice literature are the Prisoners' dilemma (or PD) and Kenneth Arrow's General Possibility Theorem. However, amongst political scientists, the former has tended to garner most of the attention as a practical issue which potential or actual collectivities must overcome. The complexity of Arrow's problem, and the number of somewhat controversial conditions it places upon decision-making systems, have prompted some scholars to classify his proof as a mathematical curiosity (Dahl and Lindblom 1965). Indeed, the conditions which he places upon the ordering of possible states into a social welfare function are often viewed as too restrictive to be of general relevance for most political analyses. This paper argues that the division between the two problems is artificialfor the Prisoners' dilemma is actually a specific example of the general Arrow problem. What follows falls into three parts. The first reviews the PD problem and Arrow's conditions, and proves that the twoperson Prisoners' dilemma game assumes all five conditions in its structure. The combination of these conditions provides the sting in the PD problem. The second part follows Hardin's argument (1971; 1982), that the problem of collective action constitutes a specific example of the Prisoners' dilemma. Here, I show that the problem of collective action involving more than two persons is equally an expanded version of the general Arrow problem. Finally, I examine some solutions which have been advanced by various theorists for the Prisoners' dilemma and the problem of collective action. Each solution operates by violating, in a reasonable fashion, one of the conditions Arrow puts forth in his proof. I conclude by discussing how these results affect our view of the Prisoners'
Arrow · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Prisoner's dilemma · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
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| Highly cited | No |
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