Public Responsibility and Federal Advisory Groups
A Case Study
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10875752 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Norman F Keiser (State University of New York at Oswego, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1958 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 251-264 |
| Publication date | 1958-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Western Political Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0043-4078 • E-ISSN: 2325-8675 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591295801100207 |
| OpenAlex | W2025956360 |
| Language | EN |
HE PARTICIPATION of private groups in the electoral and legislative processes is time-honored, and an essential feature of democratic government. But the delegation of public power to private groups at a later stage in the governmental process has no theoretical foundation in democratic thought; it reflects rather the philosophy of corporativism. In the Schecter case the Supreme Court, in holding the National Recovery Administration to involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, glanced askance at the participation of industry committees in the rule-making function;1 and in the Carter Coal case,2 in holding the first Guffey Coal Act unconstitutional, the Court emphasized the fact that the delegation of legislative power was to a private body. Nevertheless the practice has made some headway. States have given the power of arrest to the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and have given public status to privately paid industrial police.3 In effect the integrated gives the power of licensing lawyers to the state bar association, and the Missouri plan gives the bar association a powerful voice in the choice of state judges. State unfair trade practice laws have virtually authorized trade associations to fix legally binding retail prices.4 The federal government has on a number of occasions entrusted to private groups the power of nominating persons to be appointed to public office.5 In the 1930's federal regulatory legislation introduced a number of devices which made official action dependent upon the approval of those who produced or marketed agricultural commodities.6 Recent legislative history also shows an increasing tendency to grant representation to private groups in the administrative process.7 No one would contend that the interest of the public rather than of special groups is invariably served when private groups are denied a share in appointive or rule-making or administrative functions. It does seem possible, however, as the Supreme Court has suggested, that delegating
Business · Delegation · Democracy · Government (linguistics) · Legislation · Legislature · Political science · Politics · State (computer science) · Supreme court · Law · Law, Rights, and Freedoms · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Property Rights and Legal Doctrine · Public Administration
| Highly cited | No |
|---|