Reasons, Causes, and Action Explanation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10927553 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark Risjord (0000-0003-2129-2009, Emory University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 294-306 |
| Publication date | 2005-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of the Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-3931 • E-ISSN: 1552-7441 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0048393105277987 |
| OpenAlex | W2013986097 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 7 |
To explain an intentional action one must exhibit the agent’s reasons. Donald Davidson famously argued that the only clear way to understand action explanation is to hold that reasons are causes. Davidson’s discussion conflated two issues: whether reasons are causes and whether reasons causally explain intentional action. Contemporary work on explanation and normativity help disentangle these issues and ground an argument that intentional action explanations cannot be a species of causal explanation. Interestingly, this conclusion is consistent with Davidson’s conclusion that reasons are causes. In other words, reasons are causes, but rationalizing explanations are not causal explanations
Action (physics) · Argument (complex analysis) · Conflation · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Methodological individualism as opposed to methodological holism. History, relevancy and the implications of the (insoluble?) debate on the explanatory capacity and scientific status of sociocultural anthropology
Interpretivism and Causal Explanations
Almost Pregnant
Inference, explanation, and asymmetry
Styles of Causal Thought
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.29 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2021 (13) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |