When are stable rights to rents bad
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10933166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Sutter (University of Oklahoma, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 98 |
| Issue | 1-2 |
| Pages | 29-41 |
| Publication date | 1999-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Choice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1023/a:1026452214108 |
| OpenAlex | W1608684497 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
Economic rent · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Incentive · Inefficiency · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Point (geometry) · Politics · Property rights · Public economics · Public finance · Rent-seeking · Seekers · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Taxation and Compliance Studies
Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society
Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation
Transfer seeking and avoidance
Marginal lobbying cost and the optimal amount of rent seeking
Efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |