Competing bureaus and politicians
A compliance approach to the diversion of public funds
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10933502 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Silvia Fedeli (0000-0002-2281-9856, Sapienza University of Rome, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue | 3-4 |
| Pages | 253-270 |
| Publication date | 1999-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Choice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1023/a:1018331901088 |
| OpenAlex | W1598522617 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 11 |
Competitive equilibrium · Economic rent · Economics · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Production (economics) · Public finance · Public good · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2003 - 2018 (16) |
| Highly cited | No |