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Informational limits to democratic public policy

The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance

Bibliographic Data

ID10933503
AuthorsRoger D Congleton (0000-0002-3637-718X, George Mason University, corresponding author)
Year2007
Volume132
Issue3-4
Pages333-352
Publication date2007-08-06
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePublic Choice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11127-007-9155-z
OpenAlexW3123588355
LanguageEN
Citations received18
References cited42

Competition (biology · Condorcet method · Democracy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Ignorance · Jury · Law and economics · Majority rule · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public finance · Voting · Yardstick · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Mathematics

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  • Party discipline, representation, and the condorcet jury theorem

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    Open Access•Roger D Congleton•Kyklos•2024

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Unique citing works18
Citations per year1,29
Citation span2012 - 2026 (15)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 18

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