Paradoxes on the commons
Scarcity and the problem of equality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11041998 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Julian J Edney (University of California, Irvine, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1981 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 3-34 |
| Publication date | 1981-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Community Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0090-4392 • E-ISSN: 1520-6629 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/1520-6629(198101)9:1<3::aid-jcop2290090102>3.0.co;2-b |
| OpenAlex | W2071826882 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 64 |
Resource scarcities challenge the fundamental assumptions of a reward-oriented, egalitarian society because scarcity itself usually means some unequal allocation of the scarce goods. If they are important or vital to members, the suffering resulting from deprivation is also unequally distributed. Maintaining a societal ethic of equality and a high value on happiness while chronically contradicting these in practice requires that certain social paradoxes be maintained; the resulting dissonances add stress to the community already afflicted by the direct consequences of the scarcity itself. This paper addresses the problem from the point of view of commons dynamics and as both a problem in value conflict and one in social structure. It reviews the theory of tragic choices, which addresses some of these points and which proceeds on assumption that inequality, scarcity, and suffering are facts of human existence. Compared against it are three psychological theories (game, social trap, and equity theories), all three of which are found to contribute differing insights to commons problems, but all are found to be of limited value in this context. The comparison does suggest, however, that tragic choice theory's basic assumptions have merit. Implications are then explored in a functionalistic analysis of adaptive behaviors in commons scarcities. The value of small subgroups is discussed. It is proposed that under some conditions (such as where equal territorial division is impractical) the commons is better preserved by accepting inequality among subgroups than by either maintaining equality of all members (a component of the Marxian solution) or by dictatorial (Hobbesean) control, as suggested by other analysts. Freedom of choice is better protected. The paper identifies the psychological qualities of honesty (following tragic choice theory), trust, and trustworthiness as being functional qualities in this group problem, but suggests that happiness is not. Briefly discussed is the interdisciplinary problem of differing views of the nature of man for possible policy implications on this topic. Research directions are suggested.
Commons · Context (archaeology) · Economics · Equity (law) · Inequality · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Positive economics · Scarcity · Social dilemma · Value (mathematics) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law
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The Justice Motive in Social Behavior
A Theory of Psychological Reactance
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The commons problem
Probabilistic functionalism
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Cooperation and Group Size in the N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma
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Effect of incentives and education on resource conservation decisions in a simulated common dilemma
Many hands make light the work
Communication and sex effects in a five-person Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation
Concern for the common good in an N-person game
Cooperation in a three-person Prisoner's Dilemma
Equity, Equality, and Need
Some Principles of Stratification
Non-adaptive group behavior
Trust, trustworthiness, and the F scale
Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners' Dilemma
An Experimental Study of Individual Vs. Group Interest
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| Unique citing works | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,32 |
| Citation span | 1982 - 2026 (45) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |