Of veto players and entity-voting
Institutional gridlock in the Bosnian reform process
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11048063 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Birgit Bahtić-Kunrath (University of Salzburg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 899-923 |
| Publication date | 2011-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Nationalities Papers (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0090-5992 • E-ISSN: 1465-3923 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00905992.2011.614224 |
| OpenAlex | W2038153165 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
| References cited | 20 |
Entity-voting in the Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly is a veto mechanism in Bosnia's consociational institutional setting and an important reason for the country's orientation towards the political status quo. An empirical analysis of the number and nature of adopted and rejected draft laws during the legislative period 2006–2010, embedded in George Tsebelis's veto player approach, leads to the conclusion that the veto players in the parliament – either delegates from Republika Srpska or delegates from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – have pushed the consociational system of checks and balances to its extremes. Entity-voting enables the veto players to “hijack” the parliament for their exclusionary ethnic interests and discourages cooperation and compromise between the veto players. Significant legislation, which in the present article is defined as legislation relevant for the European Partnership, faces severe obstacles to getting passed. In the light of these findings, the article discusses three policy implications: institutional redesign, a change of the actors, and an active role of the European Union for providing the actors with a realistically achievable goal which they equally share. This should reset the current calculus of self-interest and encourage cooperation between the veto players
Bosnian · Compromise · Economics · Gridlock · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Status quo · Status quo bias · Veto · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration
Veto Rights in Power-Sharing Democracies
Transnational veto players in conflict negotiations
Getting things done
Change amidst continuity? Assessing the 2018 regional elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina
International Judges on Constitutional Courts
Back to square one
Does Democracy Matter in Consociational Systems
Online ethnic segregation in a post-conflict setting
Illusory Disparities
A three-legged race
Veto Rights and Vital Interests
Sistem te laže
Competing Principals in a Multinational State
The plight of civic parties in divided societies
The ‘Uncle Tom’ dilemma
The Use and Abuse of Veto Rights in Power-Sharing Systems
What Do We Know about Power Sharing after 50 Years
Consociational settlements in deeply divided societies
Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies
Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”
The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions
Veto Players
Democracy in Plural Societies
European integration and the Western Balkans
Ethnopolitik in Bosnien-Herzegowina
Bosnia
Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in bosnia and herzegovina
Local institutional engineering
The Bosnian State a decade after Dayton
The politics of ‘democratization’
Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building
The Prospect of European Integration and Conflict Transformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Cementing Divisions
The ‘West Bank of the Drina’
Decision Making in Political Systems
Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies
| Unique citing works | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,58 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 19 |