Hegel, Lukacs and Korsch

It must be emphasized that Lukács does not mean the category of totality either in an objectivistic sense, as “plenitude,” or in a functionalist sense, which would result from its reduction to interaction. In connection with the critique of modern rationalism's claim to totality, especially in Kant, he shows that, on the contrary, the logic of the totality is possible only if, as in Hegel, it is grounded on the “qualitative material nature of their content, in matter in the logical and philosophical sense of the word.” In order for the materialist dialectic to be a logic of history able to deal with the “uninterrupted outpouring of what is qualitatively new,” it must come about as a dialectic of subject and object: only the subject's qualitative dimension removes from the becoming of concrete contents the character of irrationality with which it is still tarnished in the abstractly calculating thought of rationalism—as is best expressed by rationalism's inability to solve the problem of crises

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• Freedom in theory and praxis

  Open Access•Charles E Marske•Human Studies•1979

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• Verstehen and Dialecdtic

  Open Access•John J Sewart, John Sewart•Philosophy & Social Criticism•1978

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