The Power of Money
Global Capital and Policy Choices in Developing Countries
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11064951 |
|---|---|
| Authors | George E Shambaugh (0000-0003-3607-5082, Georgetown University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 281 |
| Publication date | 2004-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1519883 |
| OpenAlex | W2067434349 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 33 |
Extant studies of the impact that international phenomena have on policy choices, and those focused on the political economy of exchange-rate regimes in particular, are incomplete because they do not consider the effect that reliance on global capital has on the policy preferences of domestic groups. Consequently, they cannot explain why some newly emerging market countries pursue fixed exchange regimes under political and economic conditions — such as recently completed elections, uncompetitive export sectors, and poor national economic performance — in which others have altered their policies. I argue that reliance on different types of foreign capital generates distinct capital-specific policy preferences. Furthermore, rather than simply mimicking the preferences of foreign investors, domestic groups are likely to promote policies that reduce their capital-specific risks and vulnerabilities. Panel logit models of exchange-rate regimes in emerging market countries from 1973 through 2000 demonstrate that higher levels of democracy bolster these effects
Capital (architecture · Capital flows · Democracy · Developing country · Economic growth · Economics · Emerging markets · Exchange rate · Extant taxon · International economics · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Monetary economics · Panel data · Political science · Politics · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · International Development and Aid
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy
The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies
CHAPTER ONE. International Influence on Economic Policy
Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies
One money, one market
New Tools in Comparative Political Economy
The Politics of Economic Adjustment
Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change
Has Globalization Gone Too Far
Capital mobility, exchange rates and fiscal policy in the global economy
The Political Economy of Trading States
Stabilization and its Discontents
On becoming more flexible
Surrendering to markets
Globalization and government spending around the world
Temporary Stabilization
Real Sources of European Currency Policy
Political responses to interdependence
Phoenix Risen
The Political Economy of Speculative Attacks in the Developing World
Explaining Styles of Financial Market Opening in Chile, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey
Domestic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments in the Developing World
Capital Mobility and State Autonomy
Domestic and Systemic Determinants of Capital Controls in the Developed and Developing World
Capital mobility, trade, and the domestic politics of economic policy
Invested interests
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
Political Parties and Monetary Commitments
Class Versus Industry Cleavages
Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments
How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy
From Poster Child to Basket Case
Constructing Reform Coalitions
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |