The Career Patterns of Air Force Generals
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11065019 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Arnold Kanter (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 353 |
| Publication date | 1977-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2110499 |
| OpenAlex | W2335364356 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
Politically accountable officials must depend upon career subordinates for the expertise which informs policy choices and for the implementation which translates decisions into actions. These career subordinates are the products of closed personnel systems which are reputed to be homogenizing, insular, and unresponsive. The careers of 1156 Air Force line officers who served in the four general grades from 1953 to 1972 are examined for insights into behavior of that service's closed personnel system. Three complementary models of career personnel systems which illuminate the results also are presented. The findings suggest potential organizational strategies for mitigating the insularity of closed personnel systems and for strengthening the leverage of politically accountable officials over the systems' behavior. Although it is readily acknowledged that the President is the most powerful individual in the American policy process, it has become nearly as widely accepted that he is far from omnipotent. At least since Neustadt (1960), we have become sensitive to the President's dependence upon others. Moreover, his dependence extends beyond those actors over whom he exercises no formal authority to career civilian and military members of the executive branch. These bureaucrats supply the information, expertise, implementation, and political support that shape the President's policy positions and mediate between decisions and actions (Halperin and Kanter, 1973). The military services perhaps provide the clearest examples of officials' dependence on career subordinates. For foreign policy options entailing the use of threat or military power, politically accountable decision makers are inescapably dependent upon senior career officers for information and execution (Halperin, 1974). These uniformed subordinates are the products of closed personnel systems which (a) recruit members at or near the beginning of their professional lives; (b) staff higher organizational levels by means of promotion from within; and (c) preclude outside competition for positions by barring lateral entrants (Mosher, 1969, p. 605)
Business · Foreign policy · Leverage (statistics · Military service · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public relations · Service (business · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Law · Marketing · Military History and Strategy · Psychology
Some Observations about Foreign Service Reform
The Reinforcement of Traditional Career Patterns in Agencies under Stress
The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations
The Education of the Senior Military Decision-Maker
Selective Promotion in Officer Cohorts
Contrasting Institutions of Air Force Socialization
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |