Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

European Community Enlargement and Institutional Choice in the Common Agricultural Policy

Bibliographic Data

ID11065097
AuthorsC Ford Runge, Harald Von Witzke
Year1990
Volume34
Issue1
Pages254
Publication date1990-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2111518
OpenAlexW2317499250
LanguageEN
References cited6

In less-developed countries, the agricultural population (a majority) is often heavily taxed, whereas in developed countries the agricultural population (a minority) is heavily subsidized at the expense of the nonagricultural sector. The European Community (EC) may be considered a developed country. Its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) supports agricultural prices at levels considerably above world markets. We argue that present institutional arrangements in the CAP, originally designed for an EC of six relatively homogeneous countries, contribute significantly to the economic and political problems that constrain European agricultural integration. The growing number of member countries and the increasing divergence of national interests are forcing a discussion of institutional innovations in an enlarged EC. By analyzing the demand for and supply of these innovations from a public choice perspective, we believe that they can be both predicted and improved in the process

Agricultural policy · Agriculture · Business · Common Agricultural Policy · Development economics · Divergence (linguistics · Economic policy · Economics · European community · European union · Geography · International economics · International trade · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Population · Resizing · Subsidy · Agricultural Economics and Policy · Economics of Agriculture and Food Markets · Local Government Finance and Decentralization

  • Toward a theory of induced institutional innovation

    Vernon W Ruttan, Yujiro Hayami•The Journal of Development Studies•1984

  • The Theory of Committees and Elections

    Open Access•Duncan Black, Georg Kunze•Theory of Committees and Elections•1986

  • The Logic of Collective Action

    Mancur Olson•Logic of Collective Action•1965

  • Rules Rather than Discretion

    Finn E Kydland, Edward C Prescott•Journal of Political Economy•1977

  • Institutions and the Free Rider

    Carlisle Ford Runge•The Journal of Politics•1984

  • A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence

    Gary S Becker•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1983

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae