Official Justifications for America’s Role in Indochina, 1949–67
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11068298 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hugh M Arnold (University of Nebraska–Lincoln, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1975 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 31-48 |
| Publication date | 1975-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Asian Affairs An American Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-7678 • E-ISSN: 1940-1590 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00927678.1975.10554160 |
| OpenAlex | W1994881466 |
| Language | EN |
VETNAM WAS America's longest war and, despite many explanations by many people (or perhaps because of this), probably the least clearly understood. There have been scores of books and articles written on the reasons for American involvement in Vietnam, both by scholars and journalists and those within the government. What reasons were most often cited by those who actually made the policy? This essay attempts to ascertain, through the technique of content analysis, the official justifications most often cited for America's involvement in Indochina from 1949 through 1967. Its purpose is simply to determine quantitatively the specific rationales cited for US policy during this time period, not to analyze their validity. The material examined comes entirely from the documents and statements of those actually in power and making the decisions on Vietnam. Many reasons have been offered to explain the American involvement in Indochina. Altogether, 22 separate rationales can be identified as appearing with some frequentcy in the official sources. They are as follows (the one-word symbol in brackets is used to identify or refer to these themes in the rest of the paper)
Political science · History · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
| Highly cited | No |
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