Keeping Nothing Secret
United Kingdom Chemical Warfare Policy in the 1960s
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11158233 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian Balmer (0000-0002-8130-8423, University College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 871-893 |
| Publication date | 2010-12-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Strategic Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0140-2390 • E-ISSN: 1743-937X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402390.2010.498285 |
| OpenAlex | W2032657961 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
After renouncing an offensive chemical warfare programme in 1956, the UK Cabinet Defence Committee decided in 1963 to re-acquire a chemical warfare retaliatory capability. This article describes how the re-acquisition decision was engendered by a combination of novel research findings, changes in strategic thinking, new intelligence and pressures from NATO. Despite the 1963 decision, no new chemical weapons capability was acquired by the UK and information that Britain lacked a stockpile of chemical weapons was eventually leaked to the public, initiating a fierce debate between ministries over the significance of this leak. This paper argues that non-existent technology is equally problematic for government secrecy, and equally consequential for government action, as what exists. Furthermore, actors' different interpretations of what constituted a secret, point towards a more subtle understanding of secrecy than simply construing it as the hiding or uncovering of items of information
Biological warfare · Cabinet (room · Chemical warfare · Computer security · Epistemology · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Nothing · Offensive · Operations research · Political science · Secrecy · Sociology · Stockpile · Computer Science · Engineering · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Public Administration
| Highly cited | No |
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