Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind
The Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation of Conflict – The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11158786 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martijn Kitzen (Netherlands Defence Academy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 713-734 |
| Publication date | 2012-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Strategic Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0140-2390 • E-ISSN: 1743-937X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402390.2012.706972 |
| OpenAlex | W2090949636 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 1 |
In contemporary counter-insurgency campaigns de-escalation is typically achieved by obtaining the local population's collaboration. The rationale underlying this approach is that such collaboration spawns control over the population and therefore weakens the insurgent's position. This article seeks to understand how this approach is practised in the reality of contemporary counter-insurgency warfare. In Iraq as well as Afghanistan counter-insurgents were confronted with fragmented indigenous societies in which the various local segments were dominated by local power-holders. Consequently, obtaining the local population's collaboration required co-option of these agents. As such a strategy of co-option is a highly localized approach, this article focuses on Afghanistan's Uruzgan province and analyzes the implementation of co-option by the Netherlands' Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), which operated there from 2006 to 2010. The analysis discusses how the counter-insurgents obtained a profound understanding of Uruzgan's societal landscape and how co-option of local power-holders became part of the counter-insurgency routine. In the end, co-option was successfully implemented as TFU even succeeded in obtaining the collaboration of previously marginalized elements of the population. However, as the methods employed for co-option were mainly of a persuasive nature, the TFU co-option strategy was less effective in containing the influence of notorious spoilers. Thus this case study provides an insight into the dynamics and limitations of co-option as a tool for de-escalation in contemporary counter-insurgency warfare
Indigenous · Insurgency · Physics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Population · Power (physics · Sociology · Law · Military History and Strategy · Peacebuilding and International Security · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
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| Citations per year | 0.85 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2024 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |