How the Russian army changed its concept of war, 1993–2022
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11158795 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dimitri Minic (Russia/Eurasia Center, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris, France, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 29-63 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Strategic Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0140-2390 • E-ISSN: 1743-937X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402390.2023.2199445 |
| OpenAlex | W4377943119 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 11 |
The traditional and high-intensity war that has occured in Ukraine since Russia decided to invade raises a key issue: did post-soviet Russian strategic thought really prepare Russia for waging this war? An analysis of Russian military sources shows that the ‘special military operation’ was not supposed to lead to such a war. Quite the contrary, it was part of the post-Soviet Russian military theorizing about bypassing armed struggle. To understand this theorization and its long-term implementation in Ukraine, it is necessary to analyze the main Russian military debate since 1993: what is war
Economic history · Military operations other than war · Military science · Military sociology · Military strategy · Military theory · Operational level of war · Political economy · Political science · Red Army's tactics in World War II · Revolution in Military Affairs · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · World War II · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · History · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense
| Citations per year | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |