The covert campaign against Iran’s nuclear program

Implications for the theory and practice of counterproliferation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID11158992
AutoresRichard Maher (0000-0002-3391-7224, University College Dublin, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen44
Número7
Páginas1014-1040
Fecha de publicación2021-11-10
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Strategic Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0140-2390 • E-ISSN: 1743-937X
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01402390.2019.1662401
OpenAlexW2979135780
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas37

This paper examines the covert campaign against Iran’s nuclear program and the implications it holds for both the theory and the practice of counterproliferation. The paper evaluates the degree to which covert action succeeded in producing meaningful delays and disruptions to Iran’s nuclear progress, in enhancing U.S. diplomatic leverage, and in helping to compel Iranian leaders to accept limits and restrictions on their country’s nuclear activities. More broadly, the paper analyzes the merits and viability of covert counterproliferation strategies, including how to define and measure the effectiveness of covert counterproliferation activity and how and under what conditions covert counterproliferation can be effective

Action (physics · Covert · Leverage (statistics · Political science · Public relations · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Nuclear Issues and Defense