Rewarding Fire with Fire

Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics

Bibliographic Data

ID11216111
AuthorsJerrold M Post (0000-0001-8258-5724, George Washington University, corresponding author)
Year1987
Volume10
Issue1
Pages23-35
Publication date1987-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueTerrorism (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0149-0389 • E-ISSN: 2378-5608
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10576108708435644
OpenAlexW2081842766
LanguageEN
Citations received17
References cited8

Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset, A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like‐minded individuals with a similar world view that "it's us against them, and they are the cause of our problems." This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justifies their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members. Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mind set of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides. Identifying the locus of control is of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter‐terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state‐supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect serves as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter‐terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatiatory policies, can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti‐terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support

Collective identity · Commit · Criminology · Epistemology · Ideology · Injustice · Mindset · Political science · Politics · Terrorism · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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