Cyber deterrence and critical-infrastructure protection
Expectation, application, and limitation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11221322 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alex S Wilner (0000-0003-2087-252X, Carleton University, corresponding author), Alex Wilner |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 309-318 |
| Publication date | 2017-08-08 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Strategy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0149-5933 • E-ISSN: 1521-0448 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01495933.2017.1361202 |
| OpenAlex | W2766724156 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
Linking deterrence theory to cybersecurity policy and critical-infrastructure protection is easier said than done. Recent cybersecurity incidents involving the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea illustrate the yawning gap between cyber deterrence expectations, applications, and results. This article draws on classical deterrence theory to illustrate how the logic of deterrence applies to cybersecurity policy and strategy. By differentiating between physical and digital critical infrastructure protection, the article explores the promises and pitfalls of cyber deterrence in practice. Seven limitations are explored in detail, including: denying digital access, commanding cyber retaliation, observing deterrence failure, thwarting cyber misfits, addressing the cyber power of weakness, attributing cyber attacks, and solidifying red lines
Business · Computer security · Critical infrastructure · Cyber-attack · Cyberwarfare · Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Computer Science · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies · Information and Cyber Security · Law · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
| Citations per year | 1.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |