The rise and fall of the “McNamara line”
Enduring lessons from the Vietnam War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11221401 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Rühle (Energy Security Section, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO, Brussels, Belgium., corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 404-413 |
| Publication date | 2018-10-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Strategy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0149-5933 • E-ISSN: 1521-0448 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01495933.2018.1526567 |
| OpenAlex | W2948624399 |
| Language | EN |
At the peak of the Vietnam War, US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announced the construction of an electronic anti-infiltration barrier south of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam. By curbing the infiltration from the north, McNamara sought to end the strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam, de-escalate the conflict and thus lay the groundwork for negotiations. However, due to numerous political, technical and military flaws, the “McNamara Line” and its related concepts failed. The rise and fall of the “McNamara Line” offers many pertinent lessons on the relationship between military strategy, technology and politics
First line · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Vietnam War · History · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Law · Medicine · Military and Defense Studies · Military History and Strategy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |