The rise and decline of the Israeli offensive
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11221518 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ehud Eilam (Independent Analyst, Boston, MA, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 245-253 |
| Publication date | 2021-05-04 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Strategy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0149-5933 • E-ISSN: 1521-0448 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01495933.2021.1912500 |
| OpenAlex | W3172222584 |
| Language | EN |
In recent decades there has been a clear decline in both the scale and how deep the Israeli military had penetrated into enemy territory. The article first examines how Israel managed to gain impressive victories in high intensity wars, mostly in 1967, by carrying out large scale ground offensives. Then the article argues that in fighting non state actors (Hezbollah/Hamas) in the 1990s, and in the 2006, 2008-2009 and 2014 wars, Israel relied too much on air power and not on a major ground offensive. The reasons for this approach were fear of the political ramifications. Israel also strongly wished to avoid heavy casualties, of both Israelis and Arab noncombatants
Adversary · Computer security · Economic history · Offensive · Operations research · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · State (computer science · Engineering · History · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies · Law
| Highly cited | No |
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